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Abstract
Every model of the consumer purchase journey includes an evaluation
phase, during which consumers search for product attributes including price.
While much has been written about search, knowledge uncertainty, and the role of
price in continued search and purchase intent, very little, if any, empirical work
has been done to understand the impact on the path to purchase when objective
price is not available. This study undertakes a field experiment with random
assignment in a natural setting to examine the impacts on consumer behavior
related to continued search, lead generation and purchase intent when objective
price is not available. The results provide evidence that the absence of objective
price information during the evaluation stage of the purchase journey reduces
search, lead generation and purchase intent. While this experiment was conducted
in the context of a high cost, high involvement consumer product, many
executives in B2B marketplaces would benefit from evidence of the impact of
hiding price from B2B customers, providing a fertile area for future research.
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Introduction
Overview
The consumer decision journey or purchase journey can be long and
complex for high cost, high involvement products. It can also be much simpler
and more direct for low cost, low involvement products. At the center of most
models of the purchase journey is evaluation of the product under consideration
for purchase. The evaluation stage of the consumer purchase journey involves
the search for information about the product including product attributes and
price.
There is robust literature that considers consumer search and the impacts
of knowledge uncertainty on the extent of search and purchase intent (Ratchford,
2001; Urbany, Dickson and Wilkie, 1989; Block, Sherrell and Ridgeway, 1986;
Urbany, 1986; Zimmerman and Geistfeld, 1984; Stigler, 1961). The literature on
pricing is also rich and addresses issues from the consumer’s response to prices,
framing of prices, how to price, and the impact of objective price, reference
prices, and perceived price on purchase intent and much more (Krishna, Briesch,
Lehmann and Yuan, 2002; Compeau and Grewal, 1998; Chen, Monroe, YungChien, 1998; Lichtenstein, Ridgway and Netemeyer, 1993; Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). Nearly all of this research and pricing literature assumes that
objective price information is readily available for search in the purchase journey.
As Owen (2003) pointed out, there are many situations encountered by
consumers where price information is missing or hidden. In his exploratory work,
Owen studies both low cost, low involvement products (such as milk at a
10 | P a g e

convenience store where price is not marked) and high cost, high involvement
products (such as fine jewelry in a locked case with prices tags turned upside
down). Extant research suggests that missing prices for low cost, low
involvement products would be expected to have little impact on continued search
and purchase intent for these products because they are likely to be familiar to the
purchaser, involve a single use and involve little risk. High cost, high
involvement products, on the other hand, tend to be durable products involving
significant perceived risk, and price plays an important role in determining deal
valuation, continued search and purchase intent (Shannahan, Dupuis, Bush, and
Rocco, 2009; Owen, 2003; Bloch, et al., 1986; Urbany, 1986; Stigler, 1961).
While nearly all of the search and pricing literature assumes that objective
price information is readily available for search in the purchase journey there are
industries of significance where price information is missing or very hard to find.
While noted industries may not exhaust the list of industries that hide price, it
does include all of the significant consumer product industries noted in an
exhaustive review of the literature. New boat and RV manufacturers and dealers
typically do not publish prices on manufacturer, dealer or third-party websites or
in printed product literature. This is also true of in-ground pool manufacturers
and dealers, some window manufacturers and dealers, and other consumer durable
goods industries. It is also true in professional services industries, including
healthcare and legal services, where prices are not obvious or advertised. There
are more than 18,000 listings on RVTrader.com that do not include a price
(Edwards, 2018). And, a representative of BoatTrader.com reported directly to
11 | P a g e

the author that there are more than 29,000 new boat listings on BoatTrader.com
that do not include a price.
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS.gov), effective
January 1, 2019, requires hospitals to publish a list of their standard charges on
the internet (Glidden, 2018). How this flows across other types of health services
and providers and how it impacts consumer behavior in purchasing healthcare
remains to be seen. In this heavily regulated industry, it does demonstrate the
push for better pricing visibility for consumers. In less regulated industries,
changes will likely require a paradigm shift in management thinking about pricing
visibility.
Understanding of consumer decisions when objective price is not available
and price knowledge is uncertain will fill a gap in the literature and provide
valuable insights to companies that hide objective price in industries selling high
cost, high involvement products.

There may be alternatives to hiding price and

one intent of this study is to provide clear supporting evidence for companies and
industries to re-consider this practice.
Recreational boating is a significant industry. According to the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, in their preliminary estimate of the Outdoor
Recreation Satellite Account, in 2017 recreational boating and fishing accounted
for $38.3 billion of gross economic output (U. S. Bureau of Economic Affairs,
2018). The National Marine Manufacturers Association’s Statistical Abstract of
Recreational Boating (2018), reports that retail sales of new boats, engines, and
trailers, alone, totaled $13.5 Billion in 2017.
12 | P a g e

Though new boat sales have been increasing for the past seven years they
have been in a long-term decline for nearly forty years (NMMA Statistical
Abstract of Recreational Boating, 2018). Data on boat registrations for the past
fifteen years, provided by Info-link (database of all boat registrations from 1996
to the present), show that the number of first-time boat buyers has declined by
37%. That represents 106,000 fewer first time boat buyers in 2015 than in 2000
(Discover Boating, 2017). Reversing these trends and growing sales of new
boats, and first-time boat buyers, is a key challenge of the industry. The internet
has created far greater transparency in pricing during the past twenty years, yet
there are some remaining industries that do not display objective price, including
new recreational boats. Could the failure to display objective offering price in
new powerboat advertisements be part of the cause for this steady erosion in new
boat sales and first-time boat buyers?

Also, could the results of this research

change the pricing practices of entire industries that do not publish objective
offering price on manufacturer, dealer or third-party websites, or in printed
product literature? Clear supporting evidence from this study could be an impetus
for management and industries to reconsider the practice of hiding objective price
in their online and other advertising.
In interviews with boat manufacturers, as they were recruited for this study,
they gave a number of reasons for not providing objective pricing information on
their website, and for not allowing dealers to provide objective price on dealer
websites or third-party websites. These reasons reflect a belief system that
influences their interactions with consumers and include:
13 | P a g e

•

It encourages (requires) consumers to contact the dealer for
pricing, allowing the dealer the opportunity to build a relationship
– understand the needs of the customer and make suggestions on
what options may best serve the customer’s needs;

•

Concern that a customer would compare our boats to the
competition solely on price, without fully understanding the
uniqueness of the products we build;

•

Competitors undercutting price. While price sheets are available
today the competition has to work a little harder to fully
understand how our products compare to theirs;

•

MSRP pricing can be misleading to the retail customer as there is
always some level of discounting off of MSRP and final selling
price is different from dealer to dealer, based on percentage mark
up the dealer needs to operate his dealership and freight costs.

“Customers require price information when anticipating higher price points
but are most sensitive to the effort involved in price search, perceived
manipulation, and social pressures of interaction with sales associates... (Owen,
2003, p. 140).” A study of first-time boat buyers (Discover Boating, 2017) found
that they were intimidated by the thought of contacting or visiting a boat dealer.
The belief system of boat manufacturers and dealers described above, that leads
them to advertise, “Request a Price” rather than provide an objective price, likely
triggers the negative reactions Owen describes above. This suggests that failing
to offer an objective price in advertising for boats, and other high cost, high
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involvement products, leaves the buyer feeling manipulated or forced to engage in
a social interaction with a dealer they are not yet prepared for. Could this delay,
derail or terminate search and end the purchase journey? And, in the age of
pricing transparency created by the internet, could this be contributing to the longterm decline discussed above?
During the fifteen-year decline in new boat buyers mentioned above, the
internet has led to many changes in consumer expectations, especially
surrounding transparency, in the shopping experience, consumer search and the
consumer purchase journey (Biswas, 2004; Su, 2008; Jiang, 2002). Extant
literature suggests that these missing prices could be limiting sales of new boats,
RVs and other high cost, high involvement products where price is missing in the
search process (Shannahan, et al., 2009; Owen, 2003; Bloch, et al., 1986; Urbany,
1986; Stigler, 1961).
Repeat boat buyers have experience in purchasing a boat and through
experience likely have developed an internal reference price for a new boat of
interest to them. First time boat buyers likely lack this experience and are
searching for information on a wide variety of product attributes including price.
This is consistent with learning theory and the information seeking behaviors of
new car purchasers (Bennet and Mandell 1969).
Research undertaken for Discover Boating, a national boating promotion
campaign, has concluded that for every 100 first-time boat buyers who enter the
purchase funnel, only two buy a boat (Discover Boating, 2017). The path to
purchase is filled with excitement and disappointment as first-time boat buyers do
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their research. As the consumer purchase journey can be derailed at a number of
points (dealer experience, discovery of hidden costs, lack of comprehensive
research resources, lack of peers to consult), the purpose of this study is to
understand how the lack of objective price information from manufacturers and
dealers, and in particular on a popular national third-party website, impacts
continued search for product attributes, lead generation and purchase intentions
for new powerboats.
Objectives and motivations
Extant research demonstrates that objective price can impact perceived
price, perceived quality, perceived value and purchase intention (Chang and Wildt
1994). But what is the impact on the purchase journey, including continued
search for product attributes, lead generation, and purchase intention, when
objective price information is not available? The purpose of this research is to
understand the impact on continued search for product attributes, lead generation
and purchase intent when objective price information is missing. In the context
of this study, objective price is not provided by the new boat dealer in new boat
listings on a major third-party website or by dealers or manufacturers on their
own websites.
This study undertakes the ambitious task of conducting a field experiment
with random assignment in a natural environment to examine the impacts of
missing prices for a high-cost, high involvement product on continued search for
product attributes, lead generation, and purchase intent (as a proxy for product
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sales). While there has been significant work in the domain of pricing, there is a
dearth of empirical research in the area of missing prices, and the impact of
missing prices on continued search for product attributes, lead generation and
purchase intent. Owens (2003) provided helpful exploratory work in this field and
suggested future research on the extent customers use the internet in searching for
price information in categories that typically omit or hide prices. While not
exactly responsive to Owens’ request for future research, this research does use
the internet to test the impact of missing prices on continued search for product
attributes, lead generation and purchase intent for new powerboats, a category that
typically and historically has omitted objective price information from
manufacturer, dealer and third-party websites and manufacturer product literature.
Theoretical contributions
This examination of missing prices on the purchase journey for high cost,
high involvement products is unique from three perspectives. First, in spite of the
practice in some industries to hide objective price, there have been no empirical
tests published of the impact of missing prices on continued search for product
attributes, leads, and purchase intent for high cost, high involvement products.
While there is a substantial body of work on pricing, there is a dearth of scenarios
studied where objective price is missing. This study is unique in seeking to
understand the impact of missing prices on the purchase journey and fill in
missing information in the extant literature.
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Second, the proposed study is conducted as a field experiment with
random assignment to obtain unbiased measures of continued search, lead
generation and purchase intent for a high cost, high involvement product in a
natural, online context. This field experiment seeks to provide causal findings of
the impact of missing objective price on the dependent variables being measured.
The experiment is being done in a natural environment in which consumers
searching to purchase a boat visit a third-party website in the normal course of
their daily lives. In this randomized experiment, the visitors are randomly
assigned to the treatment group (objective price is visible) or the control group
(objective price is not visible). Random assignment facilitates causal inference by
making samples randomly similar to each other so that subjects in the treatment
group and control group will both have the same average characteristics (Cook,
Campbell & Shadish, 2002). This helps to rule out alternative causes because the
only difference between the groups is the treatment. Random assignment reduces
the likelihood of potential confounding causes as they are no more likely to
happen in the treatment group than in the control group (Cook, et al., 2002).
“Randomized experiments are the most potent research design for determining
whether or not x causes y (Highhouse, 2009, p. 554).”
Third, the results of this study are based on consumer behaviors in a realworld purchase journey (real consumers considering the purchase of real
products) rather than on decisions consumers “might make” in a hypothetical
purchase journey, as seen in other studies.

This study furthers understanding of
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the extent to which information (and in this case price information) drives the
behavior of buyers in the marketplace as was suggested by Urbany (1986).
Finally, much of the research that has been done on the price of consumer
goods, focuses on the impacts of various aspects of price at the point of sale. This
research examines the impact of missing prices during the information search
portion of the purchase journey and likely much earlier in the purchase journey
than research focused at the point of sale.
Managerial contributions
Interviews with executives in the recreational boating and RV industries
identified that there are high level discussions within these companies about the
appropriateness of hiding price in the internet era, where greater transparency is
expected. There is reluctance to change decades old practices without compelling
evidence to guide their decision on this matter. This study seeks to provide
evidence to help manufacturers and dealers in industries that hide price answer
that very important question. Evidence from this study will provide support for a
fundamental change in the way industries, that currently hide or omit objective
price, approach the availability of price information made available to consumers.
The findings could positively impact product sales in a significant manner in
those industries where objective price is missing during the evaluation stage of the
purchase journey.
Manufacturers in industries that hide or omit objective price do so largely
due to pressure from their retail dealer networks. The results of this study may
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provide manufacturers in industries that hide or omit objective price with
evidence to overcome the objections of their dealer networks. Dealers, as well as
their manufacturers, want increased product sales. If this study provides support
for the assertion that the availability of objective price information during the
search process leads to increased search, lead generation and purchase intent, it
would be difficult evidence to ignore in industries selling high price, high
involvement products.
Outline of the study
This study is organized in six chapters. The second chapter is the review
of literature including a discussion of the purchase journey, level of involvement,
uncertainty and search, extent of search, economics of information theory,
knowledge and choice uncertainty, pricing theory and purchase intent. Chapter
three covers the proposed model development and the development of Hypotheses
supported by theory and prior research. The fourth chapter discusses the research
methodology including the measures used, and the study design. Chapter five
provides the results of the study and the Hypothesis testing. Chapter six is a
discussion of the research findings, managerial and theoretical implications of
findings, the limitations of this research, suggestions for future research and
concluding observations.
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Literature Review
This chapter is divided into seven sections. This chapter begins by defining the
consumer purchase journey including a discussion of the central role of
information search and evaluation in the consumer purchase journey. A model of
the traditional consumer purchase journey and a contemporary model of the
consumer purchase journey are presented in Figure 1. Next, relevant literature and
research analysis on the level of involvement and uncertainty in search, extent of
search, economics of information theory and its application to search, and theory
related to knowledge and choice uncertainty are discussed. The final sections
discuss relevant literature and research analysis related to pricing theory, the role
of price, how the lack of objective price impacts concepts in the pricing literature,
and the use of purchase intent as a proxy for sales.
The purchase journey
The consumer decision process is a journey, also referred to as the
purchase journey. Norton and Pine (2013) describe it as sequence of events that
customers go through to learn about, purchase and interact with products. The
consumer decision process, or purchase journey, has been conceptualized as a
purchase funnel. Consumers move in a linear manner through the stages of the
purchase funnel. Until recently, these purchase funnel concepts concluded with
the purchase of the product, but more contemporary conceptualizations include
post-purchase evaluation, product advocacy and continuous evaluation due to the
rise of social media and customer reviews.
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Hall and Towers (2017) suggest that consumer decision making moves
through stages from problem recognition, information search, evaluation of
alternatives, product choice and purchase evaluation (Blackwell, Miniard and
Engel, 2006; Olshavsky and Granbois, 1979; Darley, Blankson and Luethge,
2010). Others discuss awareness, interest and final decision (DeBruyn and Lilien,
2008); awareness, consideration, evaluation, purchase and use (Nunes, Bellin, Lee
and Schunck, 2013); consider, evaluate, purchase, enjoy, advocate, bond (Hudson
and Hudson, 2013). Wu (2001) summarizes an effect hierarchy model developed
by Lavidge and Steiner (1961) into three general processes, “1. Gaining
awareness and knowledge about the product, 2. Developing an attitude toward the
product, and 3. Making the purchase decision (Wu, 2001, p. 44.).”
Nunes, et al. (2013) share Accenture’s non-stop customer experience
model developed to recognize the impacts of the internet and social media on the
purchase journey and compare it to a traditional conceptualization of the purchase
funnel. The Accenture model suggests that evaluation continues after purchase
and during use as consumers are on a continuous, non-stop decision journey,
which is noted in Figure 1.
What all models of the purchase journey have in common is an evaluation
stage. In the evaluation stage the consumer searches for product information,
including product attributes and price, before they make their purchase decision.
Information search as part of evaluation, therefore, is at the center of most models
of the purchase journey, including both traditional and contemporary models.

22 | P a g e

For decades, how consumers make decisions has been a central question
of marketing and consumer behavior research. Nunes, et al., (2103) state, “The
new Rule #1 is, know your customer’s behavior on their path to purchase (p. 50).”
Acknowledging this rule and the centrality of information search in the evaluation
stage of the path to purchase, it is important to understand how missing
information, in particular, missing objective prices, affects continued search, lead
generation and purchase intent for high cost, high involvement products.
Level of involvement, uncertainty and search
Information search plays a critical role during the evaluation phase of the
path to purchase. The research question in this study involves the search for price
information for a high cost, high involvement product and the impact on
continued search, lead generation and purchase intent when objective price
information is not available. How consumer behaviors differ when objective
price is not available and price knowledge is uncertain will provide valuable
insights to companies that hide objective price in industries selling high cost, high
involvement products and will fill a gap in the literature.
What does the literature mean by involvement? “Involvement refers to
how much money, time, thought, energy and other resources consumers devote
for purchasing a product. It is one of the fundamental concepts used to explain
the consumer buying process (Solanki, 2013, p. 56).”
Low cost, low involvement products are likely to be familiar to the
purchaser, involve a single use and involve little risk. High cost, high
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involvement products, on the other hand, tend to be durable products involving
significant perceived risk and price plays an important role in determining deal
valuation, continued search and purchase intent (Shannahan, Dupuis, Bush, and
Rocco, 2009; Owen, 2003; Bloch, et al., 1986; Urbany, 1986; Stigler, 1961). The
context for this study is the recreational boating industry and recreational
powerboats are a high cost, high involvement product. This study seeks to
understand the behavior of consumers at the evaluation stage of the purchase
journey who are engaged in search for a new recreational powerboat.
“Customers are more willing to search for price information when
purchase price risk is high (e.g., durable goods), where range of prices for the
same item is wide (e.g., car dealer to car dealer), and where product variability
can signal high price variability (e.g., fine jewelry). Yet consumers continue to
encounter many shopping situations where prices are missing, hidden or vaguely
described (Owens 2003, p. 136).” In the case of recreational powerboats, all three
of these conditions exist which should indicate a high willingness to search for
information in the evaluation stage of the path to purchase of a new powerboat.
Radder and Huang (2007) suggest that symbolic meaning, image
reinforcement or psychological stimulation may also be involved in the purchase
of a high involvement product (Solomon, 1986). All of these factors, symbolic
meaning, image reinforcement and psychological stimulation, are frequently
involved in the purchase of a new recreational powerboat further identifying new
recreational powerboats as a high involvement product.
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Extent of search
There is usually greater complexity in a high involvement product leading
to more thought, more search and longer journey times (Hall et al., 2017).
Zimmerman and Geistfeld (1984) reported, in their study of economic factors
affecting search, that their results “lends support to the idea that consumers are
influenced in their search efforts by the relative size of the expenditure
(Zimmerman, et al., 1984, p. 129).” All businesses would rather sell a product
today than tomorrow, next week, next month or in the future. Missing
information that further lengthens the purchase journey or, worse, derails the
search and purchase journey would not seem to be in a seller’s best interest.
Empirical evidence provided by this study of the impacts of missing objective
prices could help to change the belief system described above and result in more
product sales.
Bloch, et al. (1986) developed a framework for consumer information
search. The framework modeled pre-purchase search and ongoing search, the
latter being the primary subject of their study. Involvement in the purchase was a
primary determinant of pre-purchase search. Making a better purchase decision is
considered the consumer’s primary motive for search. The outcomes of prepurchase search were increased product and market knowledge, better purchase
decisions and increased satisfaction with the purchase outcome.
Encouraging search to the point of preparedness to purchase is desirable if
the goal is to sell more product. Delaying, derailing or terminating search is
likely to result in the consumer delaying a purchase or abandoning the purchase
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journey. The extent of product search is influenced by the availability of product
information and the time available to search, among other things (Bloch, et al.,
1986). The extent of search is also influenced by the benefit to be derived from
additional search compared to the cost of additional search (Stigler, 1961). Most
search literature is concerned with price search. If an objective price is not
available on dealer, manufacturer or third-party websites, or in product literature,
the extent of search is likely to be minimized or search terminated because
objective price cannot be found.
As Owen (2003) suggested, the requirement to visit a dealer to get price
information likely leaves the customer feeling manipulated, lacking price
knowledge and bargaining power and uncomfortable being forced into a social
interaction with the dealer the customer may not be ready for. If the consumer is
not ready or willing to visit the dealer, it is likely search is dramatically reduced
or terminated. This could play a significant role in the research findings by
Discover Boating that only 2% of first-time boat buyers that reach the awareness
and interest stage of the purchase journey proceed to the purchase stage.
(Discover Boating, 2017)
Economics of Information theory
Economics of Information theory suggests that expected benefit is a
strong determinant of the amount of search undertaken by the consumer. The
effect of price dispersion on the extent of search has been the subject of several
studies. Greater dispersion of prices across different sellers encourages greater
search because the benefits of search (potential savings) are greater when there is
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a wide dispersion of prices than when there is a narrow dispersion of prices
(Biswas, 2004; Urbany, 1986; Zimmerman, et al., 1984; Stigler, 1961). However,
there have been no empirical studies of the extent of search if no objective price
information is available for a product. When objective price information is not
easily accessible in the search process, there is no understanding of the dispersion
of prices and therefore no benefit to continued price search. This suggests that the
absence of objective price information disrupts the path to purchase. The path to
purchase for a new powerboat buyer can be twelve months or longer (Discover
Boating, 2017). The cost of visiting multiple boat dealers to search for price is
very high and unlikely to be undertaken unless you are ready to buy. Search
theory suggests that consumers path to being ready to buy will be much longer
without availability of objective price information.
“From the manufacturer’s point of view, uncertainty concerning his price
is clearly disadvantageous. The cost of search is a cost of purchase, and
consumption will therefore be smaller… (Stigler, 1961, p. 223).” The Economics
of Information theory then suggests that hiding price which increases the cost of
search is disadvantageous to the manufacturers and dealers because consumption
will be smaller.
Knowledge and choice uncertainty
Price uncertainty is part of uncertainty about the product and product
category. Consistent with Stigler’s Economics of Information theory, research
has shown that knowledge uncertainty reduces the consumer’s search for more
information and choice uncertainty increases consumer search effort (Urbany, et
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al., 1989). Consumers who lack knowledge about the product category (such as
first-time buyers) face a more difficult search task than consumers more certain
about their knowledge (repeat buyers). Knowledge uncertainty may increase
search costs to the point that search is reduced or diminished (Stigler, 1961;
Urbany, et al., 1989). To the extent manufacturers and dealers of new boats do not
provide objective price information, it increases knowledge uncertainty and may
be a factor in derailing first time powerboat buyers’ search (and even repeat
buyers’ search), resulting in fewer sales of new boats to both first time and repeat
powerboat buyers. Hence, only 2% who enter the purchase journey end up
purchasing their first powerboat.
Choice uncertainty increases search effort. According to Urbany, et al.
(1989), increasing knowledge (by providing objective price information) may
increase choice uncertainty (by bringing more alternative products into the
consideration set) leading to greater search, which can also be characterized as
greater engagement in the search process. Greater choice uncertainty leading to
greater search could be better for the product category as a rising sea lifts all boats
(and boat manufacturers and dealers). Again, visiting a boat dealer can be
intimidating, and particularly so for first time boat buyers (Discover Boating
2017). If this is the only way they can get price information, extant research
suggests that missing prices could lead to reduced or abandoned search.
Other authors have considered the information inference processes used
by consumers when only partial information is available in a choice environment
(Ross and Creyer, 1992). Their results suggest that when there is missing
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information, consumers first look for similar information on other brands and then
to same brand similar information to infer the value of the missing information.
Where information on the attribute in question (for purposes of this study,
objective price) is not available from other brands or other models of the same
brand, it is not likely the consumer will be able to infer the value of the missing
information.
High price, high involvement products, by definition, are discretionary
purchases. They are not necessities for the most part. Owen (2003) states that in
the absence of purchase necessity (e.g., boats), many customers feel that in the
category of high price, high involvement products, the purchase can wait for
another time when the price is clearer. This suggests that it is likely customers in
the evaluation and information gathering stage of the purchase journey who are
unable to find objective pricing information easily accessible on manufacturer,
dealer and/or third-party websites, and are unable to infer objective price
information from other brands or models within brand, move on and do not
continue their search for information that would eventually result in a lead and/or
purchase.
As a high price, high involvement product, the perception of boating is
that it is expensive. The same would be true for other examples of high price, high
involvement products mentioned above. Hiding prices likely reinforces that
perception. “If consumers assume the price may be too expensive and not
affordable, learning the exact price may not be worth the trouble (Owens 2003, p.
140).” This suggests that by not making it easy for potential boat buyers to find
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information on objective price, the industry derails the purchase journey either
temporarily or permanently.
Pricing theory
Krishna’s statement that “pricing is one of the most crucial determinants
of sales,” is likely why the literature on pricing is so robust (Krishna, Briesch,
Lehmann and Yuan, 2002, p. 101). Extant research addresses issues from the role
of price, consumer’s response to prices, price presentation, the role of price
perceptions on behavioral intentions, comparative pricing, the impact of objective
price, reference prices, and perceived price on purchase intent, the impact of price
on transaction value and acquisition value, and much more (Krishna, et al., 2002;
Varki and Colgate, 2001; Compeau and Grewal, 1998; Chen, Monroe, YungChien, 1998; Grewal, Monroe, and Krishnan, 1998; Lichtenstein, Ridgway and
Netemeyer, 1993; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Nearly all of this research and
pricing literature assumes that objective price information is readily available as
the consumer is making a purchase decision or during the evaluation phase of the
purchase journey. This study examines the impact on consumer decisions and the
purchase journey when objective price is not available.
What is the role of pricing? In a market for a high price, high involvement
product, if objective price is not available, what cues or messaging about the
product is the customer missing? The role price plays in consumer decisions
about high cost, high involvement products is multi-dimensional
(Chandrashekaran, 2012; Yin and Paswan, 2007; Darke and Chung, 2005;
Chandrashekaran, 2004; Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin, 2003; Varki, et al., 2001;
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Compeau, et al., 1998; Grewal, et al., 1998; Urbany, Bearden and Weilbacher,
1988: Chang, et al., 1994; Dodd, Monroe and Grewal, 1991; Monroe, 1990;
Zeithamel, 1988; Erickson and Johansson, 1985).
The discussion below looks at the critical dimensions of pricing related to
high cost, high involvement products including the traditional economic
perspective of price, price as an indicator of quality, the role of price in purchase
intent, how price affects perceived value, transaction value and acquisition value,
and the role of objective price in formation of internal and external reference
price.
The Dual Role of Price
In the traditional economic perspective, price is a constraint. Consumers
seek to maximize utility by allocating a limited budget across a range of products
and services (Erickson et al., 1985). In any purchase, the consumer gives
something up to get something in return. They get a bundle of benefits or value
and give or sacrifice the price in return for the benefits. The value of the benefits
received are expected to exceed the price paid.
Several studies have also examined price as an indicator of the quality of
the product under consideration (Varki, et al, 2001; Grewal, et al, 1998; Chang, et
al., 1994). The expectation is bi-directional. Consumers expect to pay more for
higher quality and when they pay more, they expect to receive higher quality
(Monroe, 1990). The extent to which price is used as an indication of quality is
somewhat dependent on the availability of information on quality related
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attributes. And, the more information available on quality related attributes, the
less important price is as an indicator of quality (Erickson, et al., 1985).
Price also plays a significant role in explaining consumer purchase intent.
Erickson, et al. (1985) concluded that price plays a dual role and has both a
positive and negative effect on purchase intent. The negative effect is related to
price as a constraint, while the positive effect is through the positive effect of
price on quality perception and attitude.
“In the case of price, we found that price has, basically, two roles. The
first is as a positive influence on quality perceptions (which, in turn, reinforce
beliefs about price), and through this as a positive influence on attitude and
intention. The other major role of price is as a negative direct influence on
intention (Erickson, et al., 1985, p.198).” The negative influence on intention is a
purely a classic economic view of price.
The Behavioral Role of Price
A behavioral perspective of price concludes that price also affects the
perceived value of the purchase, through its impact on acquisition value and
transaction value, and perceived value positively influences purchase intention
(Grewal, et al., 1998; Compeau, et al., 1998; Chandrashekaran, 2004). From a
consumer behavior perspective, objective price has an indirect positive effect on
purchase intent through perceived price, acquisition value and transaction value.
Transaction value represents the extent to which consumers feel they got a
good deal on the purchase. It is operationalized as consumer perceptions of how
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attractive the deal is relative to some internal reference price (IRP). The
determinants of transaction value include IRP and contextual factors like the
presence of an advertised comparative price, known as an advertised reference
price or external reference price (ERP) (Chandrashekaran, 2004). Objective price
compared to a reference price (IRP or ERP) determines the perceived value of the
deal or transaction value to the consumer. If there is no objective price present
during purchase evaluation a necessary component to determining perceived
value is missing.
Researchers have defined acquisition value as the perceived net gains
associated with the product purchased (Dodds, Monroe and Grewal, 1991;
Zeithaml, 1988). Chandrashekaran (2004) defines acquisition value as the
consumer’s assessment of the perceived value of the benefits received from the
purchase relative to the perceived price paid for those benefits and is determined
by the perceived quality of the product and the transaction value. Since objective
price influences transaction value and transaction value is one of the determinants
of acquisition value, objective price also influences, indirectly, acquisition value.
There is a large body of work on reference pricing (Chandrashekaran,
2012; Yin, et al., 2007; Darke, et al., 2005; Chandrashekaran, 2004; Kopalle, et
al., 2003; Krishna, et al., 2002; Varki, et. al., 2001; Chen, et al., 1998; Campeau,
et. al., 1998; Grewal, et al., 1998; Chang, et al., 1994; Suter and Burton, 1996;
Urbany, et al., 1998; Lichtenstein, Burton and Karson, 1991.) Reference price is
generally divided into two types of reference price. Reference price is either an
internal standard or external standard against which the objective price offered by
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the seller is measured. That is, reference price can be anchored internally or
externally (Yin and Paswan, 2007). “Internal reference price (IRP) is defined as a
price (or price scale) in buyer’s memories that serves as the basis for judging or
comparing actual prices (Grewal, et al., 1998, p. 47).” IRP is influenced by
previous and current encounters with price and can change with exposure to new
information.
External reference price is usually discussed in the context of comparison
pricing which has its own rich literature. Actual product prices are compared with
higher comparison prices supplied by the retailer to provide an external reference
against which the offered priced can be evaluated (Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin,
2003). Researchers have examined the presentation or framing of ERP (Darke
and Chung, 2005; Chandrashekaran, 2004; Chen, et al., 1998), the impact of ERPs
that are believable or unbelievable (Compeau, et al., 1998; Suter and Burton,
1996), the effect of semantic cues on reference price ads (Lichtenstein, Burton
and Karson, 1991), the impact of ERP on IRP (Chandrashekaran, 2012; Urbany,
Bearden and Weilbaker, 1988), on perceived savings (Krishna, et al., 2002), on
perceived price (Chang, et al., 1994), and more.
Reference Price Without Objective Price
When objective price is not available in the search process, as in the case
of many new recreational powerboats, RVs, in-ground swimming pools,
windows, healthcare and legal services, many of these pricing concepts don’t
apply or apply very differently. If objective price is not displayed on
manufacturer, dealer or third-party websites, then no comparative ERP is
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displayed either. So how does the consumer evaluate the value of the deal or even
know what the deal is? If the consumer is a repeat boat buyer, they may have an
IRP. But if they are a first-time boat buyer their knowledge of pricing for new
boats may be very undeveloped. Whether a consumer has formed an IRP based
on a little knowledge or a lot of knowledge, they still have no objective price to
compare it to when objective price is missing. This will make it difficult, if not
impossible, for the consumer to create an assessment of transaction value or
acquisition value. Unable to determine what the deal is or the value of the deal,
and given continued search efforts are not likely to yield the objective price short
of visiting the dealer, it is suggested that the consumer abandons their search and
the path to purchase; if not completely, at least until later.
If the dealer or manufacturer provides an objective price for consideration
by the consumer, there is evidence that this offering price will serve as an anchor
and be used by the consumer to adjust their IRP (Chandrashekaran, 2004).
Assimilation-Contrast Theory proposed by Sherif (1963) suggests that in the
absence of other price information, an objective price advertised by the retailer
will shift their IRP through an assimilation effect (Sen, 2009). In this case, the
objective price and ERP are the same, at least until more price information can be
obtained by visiting a dealer.
Varki, et al. (2001) conclude that “price perceptions have an important
influence on customer value perceptions. In addition, by managing the
comparative price perceptions of their customers, managers could simultaneously
influence overall customer satisfaction and behavioral intentions (p. 238).” The
35 | P a g e

objective price becomes a point of reference by which to judge the value of the
offering that doesn’t exist when price is absent. This suggests that the presence of
an objective price has the benefit of influencing customer value perceptions,
transaction value and purchase intentions whereas the absence of an objective
price does not help, and may prevent, the consumer in developing value
perceptions that could positively impact purchase intent.
Formation of reference price (including IRP) depends, to a great extent, on
the availability of information about products and their prices (Grewal, et al.,
1998). When objective price is missing, a key piece of information needed to
form reference price is missing. Frankenberger and Liu (1994) suggest that, “As
customers acquire new information about market prices, IRPs are adjusted to
account for that information (p. 238).” Unknowledgeable customers may accept
the objective price as an internal reference point that influences purchase intent
(Frankenberger, et al., 1994). And, Chandrashekaran (2012) states, “It is generally
established in the literature that consumers may use some external reference
prices to adjust internal reference prices, which in turn affects evaluation (p. 54).”
Consumers usually compare the offering price (objective price) to their IRP in
evaluating the favorability of a purchase, so any effect on the IRP will influence
purchase evaluations (Lichtenstein, et al., 1991). Yin, et al., (2007) recommend
based on their study of antecedents of consumer reference price orientation, that
managers should provide more price related information to help customers form
external reference prices. All of this supports the notion that manufacturers and
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dealers of new powerboats would be better served by providing an objective price
than by hiding price.
In their meta-analysis on comparative pricing, Campeau, et al., (1998)
conclude that comparison pricing works. Grewal, et al., (1998) report their results
“suggest that acquisition value has considerable influence on buyers’ willingness
to buy (p. 56).” This suggests that providing an objective price in a market where
none exist, allows for a comparison of objective price and IRP that should
influence continued search, lead generation and, purchase intent. Varki, et al.,
(2001) suggest studying their behavioral intention model in an experimental
setting. In this long stream of research on pricing, no one has looked at the
impact of missing prices on the evaluation and search phase of the purchase
journey and related lead generation and purchase intent.
Purchase intent
Purchase intent is a measure of the consumer’s willingness to purchase. It
has been defined as the likelihood of purchasing the product. It is often
considered an important indicator of actual purchase (Chang, et al., 1994). Prior
research has predominantly used purchase intent as a proxy for actual purchase
(Morwitz, Steckel and Gupta, 2007; Weathers, Swain, and Makienko, 2015;
Gamliel and Herstein, 2012; Teng, 2009; Compeau, et al., 1998;
Chandrashekaran, 2004; Chen, et al, 1998). Purchase intentions are used
extensively by academics as proxy measures for purchase behavior. They are also
used by marketing managers to predict sales for new and existing products
(Morwitz, et al., 2007).
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In the experiment used in this study, there are three dependent variables.
One is continued search for product attributes. The other two are lead generation
and purchase intent. Lead generation might be considered a proxy for purchase
intent as purchase intent is considered a proxy for purchase. Lead generation is
used in this study because nearly all purchasers of new powerboats start as leads.
Not all leads end up as purchasers so lead generation is not a good proxy for
purchase. One would expect, however, that the more qualified leads a dealer gets,
the more sales they will close and the more opportunity they have to close sales.
Based on interviews with boat manufacturers and dealers in the recreational
boating industry, lead generation is an important metric for all marketing
expenditures made by new powerboat manufacturers and dealers.
While actual purchases would be the best measure of the impact of
missing prices on the purchase journey, the time frame for the purchase decision
can extend to six months, twelve months, or twenty-four months, making it
difficult to get actual purchase information in a timely manner. “Many surveys
contain purchase intentions questions on such items as new food products,
frequently purchased package goods, appliances, automobiles, and capital
equipment. The time frame may range from one week to 24 months (Morrison,
1979, p. 65).” Morrison (1979) refers to six months, twelve months and twentyfour months in assessing purchase intent for household appliances and
automobiles, both high cost, high involvement products, and notes that very few
published studies are able to obtain purchase intent and actual purchase behavior
on the same set of individuals. The purchase journey for new powerboats, also a
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high cost, high involvement, durable good, is typically nine to twelve months or
more.
Morwitz, et al., (2007) studied the factors associated with a strong
correlation between purchase intentions and actual purchase. The six key findings
of Morwitz, et al., (2007, p. 347) “indicate that intentions are more correlated with
purchases:
1. For existing products than new ones;
2. For durable goods than for non-durable goods;
3. For short than long term horizons;
4. When respondents are asked to provide intentions for specific brands or
models than when they are asked to provide intentions to buy at the
product category level;
5. When purchases are measured in terms of trial rates than when they are
measured in terms of total market sales; and
6. When purchase intentions are measured in a comparative mode than
when they are collected monadically.”
Morwitz, et al., (2007) conclude that their results “indicate that purchase
intentions are predictive of future behavior” and more predictive for products that
conform to these six factors (p. 361). “Intentions will be more predictive of
behavior when the consequences of purchasing are great, and consumers therefore
deliberate considerably about the purchase decision (e.g., purchasing a high
involvement durable good) (Morwitz, et al., 2007, p. 361).”
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This literature suggests that using purchase intent as a proxy for purchase
behavior is a reasonable approach. In this study, which considers purchase intent
for new recreational powerboats, all six of the factors identified by Morwitz, et
al., (2007) that lead to high intention-behavior correlations are present and map to
this product:
1. Respondents are asked to rate their purchase intent for an existing product,
a recreational powerboat that is available for purchase in real time. While
there are refinements and enhancement to new models every year, the
recreational powerboat is not a new product concept.
2. Recreational powerboats are a high cost, high involvement, durable good.
Purchase decisions for this type of product are seen as very important to
the purchaser.
3. While, Moritz, et al., (2007) suggest the correlation between purchase intent
and purchase is high for short term versus long term purchase horizons,
they acknowledge that for a high cost, high involvement, durable good, the
strength of the relationship may increase over time as consumers may
underestimate how long it will take to make the purchase decision and
needing more time to complete the purchase is common.
4. Respondents will also be asked their purchase intent for specific models
they have viewed on a third-party website after becoming a lead for that
powerboat model for the listing dealer. So, they are being asked to
indicate purchase intentions at the brand/model level and not the product
category level.
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5. Purchase intention will be measured as a proportion of people that intend to
buy and not as a measure of market sales.
6. Survey participants will be asked if they searched on other brands and
models of boats. The assumption is that respondents will have done
extensive search of comparative products so that measurement of purchase
intentions is being done in a comparative mode.
This provides strong support for using purchase intent as a proxy for purchase
in this study. Recreational powerboats map directly to each of the six factors
identified by Morwitz, et al., (2007) that lead to high intention-behavior
correlations. As a high cost, high involvement product, we can expect purchase
intentions for recreational powerboats to be strongly predictive because the
consequences of purchasing a powerboat are great, and consumers do deliberate
considerably about the purchase decision, often taking six to twelve months are
more to make the purchase decision.
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Model Development and Hypotheses
This chapter draws from the relevant literature to develop a model and
testable hypotheses based on the theoretical relationships between price visibility
and extent of search, knowledge uncertainty, economics of information theory,
pricing theory and purchase intent. A graphical depiction of the proposed
hypothesized relationships is presented in Figure 2.
This study will use a natural experiment to examine if an objective price
versus the absence of objective price has a causal impact on purchase intention, as
well as on continued product attribute search and lead generation. It looks at two
purchase journeys, with and without objective price, and how they map against
each other.
As suggested by Stigler (1961), search cost is part of the cost of a product;
increasing search cost increases the cost of the product; and, search will continue
to the point where the costs of search outweigh the benefits of search. Where an
objective offering price is missing, it increases the purchaser’s knowledge
uncertainty. The literature supports that knowledge uncertainty may increase
search costs to the point that search is reduced or diminished (Urbany, et al.
1989). The extent of product search is influenced by the availability of product
information and the time available to search, among other things. (Bloch, 1986).
Where it is common practice in an industry to hide price (such as the recreational
powerboat, RV, in-ground pool, and healthcare industries, among others)
additional search, short of a visit to a dealership, is nearly futile. The
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unavailability of price information during the evaluation phase of the purchase
journey is predicted to decrease the extent of continued product search.
Therefore, making price information available (on manufacturer, dealer and thirdparty websites), especially for a high price, high involvement product, is predicted
to encourage additional search for information about the product rather than
reduce or terminate additional search. This leads to the first two Hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Consumer search is influenced negatively by the
absence of an objective offering price for a high price, high
involvement product as demonstrated by less search for other
product attributes.
Hypothesis 2: Consumer search is influenced positively by the
presence of an objective offering price for a high price, high
involvement product as demonstrated by greater search for other
product attributes.
Knowledge uncertainty is reduced in the presence of objective offering
price information. Greater knowledge is predicted to impact search for product
attributes and price in a positive manner (Urbany, et al., 1989; Stigler, 1961).
Greater search indicates greater engagement in the purchase journey. Higher
levels of engagement are common for high price, high involvement products.
“Product involvement appears to be a basic determinant of ongoing search.
(Bloch, et al., 1986, p. 123).” The availability of an objective offering price also
has multiple effects in aiding the consumer to recognize and evaluate the deal.
Prior work has provided evidence that the availability of an objective offering
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price (versus no objective offering price being available) will likely influence the
consumer’s internal reference price which is adjusted based on the offering price
(Sen, 2009; Chandrashekaran, 2004). This allows for the formation of a
perceived price by the consumer. This perceived price combines with perceived
quality to create a perceived value of the product. The presence of an objective
offering price allows the consumer to create an assessment of transaction value
and acquisition value as well (Varki, et al., 2001). This is not possible in the
absence of an objective offering price. The highest level of search for a high cost,
high involvement product (such as a recreational powerboat, RV or in-ground
swimming pool) involves contacting a dealer for more information. At this point,
the consumer has become a lead for the dealer. Nearly all purchasers of these
type of products become a lead during the path to purchase.
Based on information from interviews with boat dealers, even though they
do not display objective price on websites or in marketing materials they do
receive leads on these new boat brands and models. These leads are received
even though an objective offering price is not available in advance of the
consumer becoming a lead. A consumer contacting a dealer to become a lead has
some level of interest or intent to purchase. Providing objective offering price
reduces knowledge uncertainty and allows the consumer to make an assessment
of perceived value, transaction value and acquisition value (Chandrashekaran,
2004; Grewal, et al., 1998; Compeau, et al., 1998). It is predicted that greater
knowledge certainty and improved value assessments that result from availability
of objective selling price information, will not only result in more leads being
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generated but stronger levels of purchase intent for those consumers who have
objective offering price information available. More leads and stronger purchase
intent should translate into more sales. The purchase journey for some high cost,
high involvement products can be as much as nine to twelve months or more.
Morwitz, et al., (2007) identified six factors that lead to a high correlation
between intention and purchase behavior (existing products, durable goods, short
term purchase horizon, asked to provide intentions for specific brands or models,
when measured in terms of trial rates, and when measured in comparative mode).
Based on these factors, it is appropriate in this study to use purchase intent as a
proxy for purchase, as many academic researchers have done.
Based on the evidence related to search (Bloch, et al., 1986; Owens, 2003;
Stigler, 1961), knowledge uncertainty (Ross and Creyer, `1992; Urbany, et al.,
1989) and pricing (Chandrashekaran, 2004; Compeau, et al., 1998; Erickson, et
al., 1985; Grewal, et al., 1998; Krishna, et al., 2002) it is predicted that the
availability of an objective offering price will increase leads to dealers of these
products and increase the purchase intent of the consumers who become leads.
This leads to four additional Hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Less leads will be generated in the absence of an
objective offering price for a high price, high involvement product.
Hypothesis 4: More leads will be generated in the presence of an
objective offering price for a high price, high involvement product.
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Hypothesis 5: Purchase intent will be weaker in the absence of an
objective offering price for a high price, high involvement product.
Hypothesis 6: Purchase intent will be stronger in the presence of an
objective offering price for a high price, high involvement product.
All of the hypothesized relationships, H1 through H6, are shown in Figure
2.
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Research Methodology
This chapter is a discussion of the methodology used in this study to test
the proposed Hypotheses. In particular, this chapter presents the measures
proposed for the study and identification of a validated scale for assessing
purchase intent. The study design is discussed in detail including a description of
the natural experiment, recruitment of manufacturers and dealers to participate in
the study by allowing price to be displayed, purchase intent survey recruitment
and a secondary method for survey data collection.
The first four Hypotheses will be examined in a natural experiment
working with a national third-party product website including display listings and
detailed product description pages for new recreational boats (a high priced, high
involvement product) and naturally occurring lead generation on the website. The
fifth and six Hypotheses will be tested using a survey of leads naturally generated
from the website to assess purchase intent.
The national third-party product website is primarily supported by
recreational powerboat dealers who pay for the new product listings on the
website. The third-party product website attracts 4.8 million visitors, on average,
per month, experiences 17.5 million page views, on average, per month, and
experiences 11 million detailed product page views, on average, per month.
Approximately one percent of visitors to this third-party website are converted to
email or phone leads for the dealers. This experiment was conducted during a
five-week period in January and February, 2019 when total page views of new
boat listings average over thirty million per month. These are also primary
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months when boat shows are held around the country and search activity is high.
The visitors to this website include actual consumers in the product evaluation
and search stage of their purchase journey.
Measures
Measures of the independent variable, objective offering price, include
present or absent. There are three dependent variables: continued product attribute
search measured as a click from the listing on the search results page to the
detailed product page; lead generation measured as a click from the detailed
product page to send an email or phone a dealer, becoming a lead; and purchase
intention measured with a three item, seven-point Likert scale, anchored at “very
low” and very high,” adopted from Grewal, et al., (1998). This scale had a
Chronbach alpha of .92 in the Grewal, et al., (1998) study indicating a high level
of scale reliability. The scale items are:
1) If I were going to buy a boat, the probability of buying this model is,
2) The probability that I would consider buying this boat is, and
3) The likelihood that I would purchase a boat is.
Study design
A national third-party website agreed to cooperate on this research. The
national third-party website is the largest online boating marketplace in the United
States for new and pre-owned boats. Through search engine optimization, online
advertising and email nurture marketing, the national third-party website drives
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prospective boat buyers to the website to do their research for a boat purchase.
They claim to reach six million prospective boat buyers each month. Dealers
contract with the third-party website to host the dealer’s product listings on the
website and dealers may either list an objective selling price or display “Request a
Price” in lieu of listing a price.
In the data field designed for price to be displayed, for each product listing
on the search results page and on the detailed product page, dealers also have the
option to show “Request a Price” instead of displaying a price. “Request a Price”
literally allows the visitor to contact a dealer to discuss the price of the product
offered and being viewed/searched. “Request a Price” on the search results page
hyperlinks to the detailed product page where there is a dialogue box the visitor
completes with first and last name, email and phone number (optional) and then
clicks on “Contact the Seller” to become a lead. Once on the detailed product
page, if the visitor hovers over “Request a Price” it brings the same lead dialogue
box to the center of the screen. A sample search results page is shown in Figure
4. A sample detailed product page is shown in Figure 5. And, a sample lead
dialogue box in the center of the screen is shown in Figure 6.
Recruitment of Manufacturers and Dealers
In addition to the national third-party website, twenty-five manufacturers
were contacted about participating in the research. An email briefly explaining
the research project was sent to the CEO of each of the twenty-five manufacturers
that included a request for a follow-up phone call to discuss the project. All
twenty-five manufacturer CEOs accepted the follow-up phone call where the
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project was discussed, questions were answered, views on displaying objective
price were discussed and interest in participation was determined. Nineteen of the
twenty-five powerboat brands, representing 76% of manufacturers recruited,
agreed to participate in this experiment. These nineteen manufacturers produce
product in eight powerboat segments (aluminum fishing boats, pontoon boats,
jetboats, bowriders, saltwater fishing boats, small cruisers, ski and wakeboard
boats, large yachts). In agreeing to participate, the manufacturers agreed to
recruit their dealers and identify which of their dealers would participate in the
experiment, based on the objective offering price each manufacturer would allow
to be used for each powerboat model in the test. Each participating manufacturer
provided a list of their dealers agreeing to participate including information on the
dealer contact who would work with the author and the third-party website. The
author communicated directly with each dealer on the process for participation.
The test involved 2,396 new boat listings from one hundred and seventy new
powerboat dealers. Descriptive statistics for the industry participants in the study
are shown in Table 1.
For this research, only manufacturers and dealers who do not display price
were recruited for participation. The participating dealer product listings on the
national third-party website were all originally “Request a Price” listings. For this
experiment, the new product listings for participating dealers were modified to
provide duplicate identical listings of product information with the only difference
in the product listings being the display of an objective offering price on one
version of the product listing for each product and no objective offering price (or
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“Request a Price”) on an otherwise identical version of the product listing for
each product (control group). Dealers’ ability to advertise an objective offering
price is limited by contract with their manufacturers providing them the product.
So, the objective offering price displayed for each boat model in the test was a
price approved by the manufacturer and agreed to by the dealer.
A flowchart describing the study design is shown in Figure 3.
The Experiment
About thirty days in advance of the start of the test, the third-party national
website prepared a spreadsheet of each participating dealer’s listings displayed on
the website. Each dealer was asked to complete the spreadsheet by indicating
their offering price, approved by their product manufacturer, on the spreadsheet
and return it to the national third-party website no later than two weeks before the
start of the test. The third-party website tracked responses and shared them with
the author, who was responsible to follow up with each dealer to make sure their
completed spreadsheets were returned on time.
Optimizely is an experimentation platform for testing digital experiences
(for more information visit www.optimizely.com). Among its many capabilities
is A/B experimentation on web pages. All of the listings in the test with the
objective offering price provided by the dealer, in the spreadsheets they were
provided, were uploaded to Optimizely by the national third-party website for this
experiment. During the test period, all visitors to the national third-party website
randomly and alternately received a cookie to designate them to see price or not
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see price when they encountered listings in the test during their product search on
the website. The Optimizely software controlled the display of the product
listings (included in the test) with and without the objective offering price based
on the cookie placed on the visitor.
The third-party national website assigned a unique identifier to each
visitor to the website that allowed tracking of their unique clickstream. Each
product listing in the test that appeared on a visitor’s search results page, with and
without objective offering price, was tracked in Google Analytics, which was
used in conjunction with Optimizely to provide clickstream data on the listing
viewed on the search results page. The clickstream data indicated whether the
visitor saw a listing in its original state (without price) or in its treatment state
(with price). Product listings in the test appeared on visitor search results pages
54,681 times. In the normal course of a visit to the national third-party website,
visitors typically do multiple searches and the same product listing could appear
on the visitor’s search results page more than once. Based on the cookie placed
on the visitor, they were always either in the treatment group (objective price
visible) or the control group (objective price not visible).
Visitors to a product listing on the search results page have the opportunity
to search further for additional product attributes by clicking forward to a detailed
product page for the listing. This click was the measure of continued search for
product attributes. Each click to the detailed product page from a search results
page was also tracked in Google Analytics, which was used with Optimizely to
provide clickstream data on the detailed listings viewed. The clickstream data
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indicated whether the visitor saw a listing in its original state (without price) or in
its treatment state (with price). Visitors to the website clicked through from a
listing in the test on the search results page to the detail product listing 22,496
times. This represents a 41% clickthrough rate from search results listing to detail
product listing. There were 22,205 unique individuals who continued searching
to the detail product listing from the search results page.
From the detail product page, visitors have the ability to click to send an
email to a dealer or phone a dealer for more information, at which point they
become a lead for that dealer. This click is the measure of lead generation.
Visitors clicking on the detailed product listing for products in the test, clicked to
email or phone a dealer from the detail listing page 184 times. This represents
137 email leads and 47 phone leads with a clickthrough rate to become a lead of
0.8%, which is very consistent with the nearly 1% lead generation rate for all
listings on the third-party website. Some visitors clicked to become a lead for the
same product with the same dealer. After deleting these duplicate leads, there
were 165 unique leads remaining, including 118 email leads and 47 phone leads.
Because of the unique Visitor ID assigned to each visitor and the unique Product
ID assigned to each product listing, there is traceability by individual from a
product listing on the search results page to the detail product page, to clicking to
email or phone a dealer which represents a lead. The unique identifiers of Visitor
ID and Product ID allowed for matching the clickstream data from the search
results page, the detail listing page and the lead generated to be matched for
analysis.
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Email Survey Recruitment and Incentive
Only the 118 email leads could be followed up with a survey. Each email
lead was sent a recruitment email by the national third-party website, using their
Saleforce.com capability to include a survey link in the recruitment email.
Salesforce.com also allowed the unique Visitor ID assigned to each visitor by the
third-party national website and the unique Product ID for the listing viewed to be
embedded in the survey link. The survey was developed in Qualtrics and was
enabled to receive these unique embedded IDs in each survey response. The
purchase intent survey is included as Appendix A and the recruitment email is
included as Appendix C.
A $10.00 Starbucks gift card was offered in the recruitment email as an
incentive to complete the survey. The Starbucks gift cards were purchased and
fulfilled through Rybbon.net, an online service that provides incentives for
completion of surveys (and other research and marketing activities) automatically
and instantly by email. At the conclusion of the survey, respondents sent their
email address to Rybbon.net and received an electronic gift card directly from
Rybbon.net. The individual responses to the survey were matched to and
combined with measures from the individual clickstream data for analysis using
the unique Visitor ID and Product ID embedded in the survey results.
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Secondary Method of Survey Data Collection
To enhance and strengthen the survey response on purchase intent, a
secondary method of data collection was also employed. The national third-party
website normally experiences lead generation equal to about 1% of detailed page
views. Expecting an 8-10% response rate to the recruitment email, there was
concern that insufficient survey response would be obtained through the primary
data collection pathway. To enrich the perspective on purchase intent provided by
the surveys, the author worked with the third-party website to augment the survey
sample. The third-party website randomly selected 9,588 additional unique
visitors, who became email leads outside the experiment, to receive the
recruitment email with the survey link. A total of 9,706 recruitment emails were
sent (9,588 randomly selected in the secondary method and 118 from the visitors
in the test). This total included 4,601 leads on new boat listings (model year 2019
or 2020) who were sent a recruitment email. A unique Visitor ID assigned to
these randomly selected leads was embedded in the survey link included in the
recruitment email and embedded in the survey responses from these email leads
by Qualtrics, to allow matching of survey responses to a list of VisitorIDs,
provided by the third-party website, that included the type of listing (with or
without price) the visitor had viewed.
A total of 252 usable surveys were received from respondents viewing
new boat listings (model year 2019 and 2020), including 187 respondents in the
control group (did not see price) and 84 in the treatment group (did see price).
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This represents a survey response rate of 5.5% to the recruitment email.
Descriptive statistics for the sample are shown in Table 2.
The 252 respondents were primarily in the age range of 35-55 (49.6%),
were predominantly male (87%) and living with a spouse or partner (81.7%),
were highly educated with sixty-eight percent reporting having a college
education with an Associates Degree or above, had three or more people living in
their household (50%), and were slightly skewed to annual household incomes of
$100,000 or greater (55.1%). Descriptive statistics for the survey respondents are
shown in Table 3.
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Results
This chapter provides the results of the Hypothesis testing. Hypotheses 1
through 4 were tested using a one sample t-test and Hypotheses 5 and 6 were
tested using an independent samples t-test.
The context of this study, is new boat listings on a major national thirdparty website where objective price is normally not provided by the new boat
dealer. This industry sells high cost, high involvement products (new boats). In
addition to not providing cost information on this national third-party website, it
is also common practice for dealers and manufacturers not to include objective
selling price for new boat listings on their own websites either.
For this reason, only surveys from leads on model year 2019 and 2020
boats (252 surveys) were used in the analysis to ensure that only surveys returned
by respondents who had viewed new boat listings were analyzed. This aligns
with industry practice to distinguish between new and used boat listings on the
national third-party website. Dealers offering pre-owned boats and new boats that
are not current model year may display an objective offering price of their
choosing on third-party websites as well as their own website. Manufacturers do
not control pricing for pre-owned boats or new boats that are not current model
year.
Test of Hypotheses 1 and 2
Hypotheses 1 and 2 state that consumer search is negatively influenced by
the absence of an objective offering price and positively influenced by the
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presence of an objective offering price for a high price, high involvement product
as demonstrated by continued search for other product attributes. Operationally,
this suggests that consumers searching for product information for a high price,
high involvement product will be more likely to click through from the search
results page product listing to the detailed product listing if objective price
information is provided in the search results page listing.
To test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, a one-sample t-test was conducted
to examine whether presence of price information induced respondents to
continue searching for additional product attributes by clicking from the listing on
the search results page to a detail product listing for the boat viewed on the search
results page. 22,205 individuals continued searching for additional product
attributes. Within that sample, respondents were more likely to continue
searching if they were provided with objective price information (mean difference
= .58, 95% CI of mean difference = .57-.58, t = 174.17, df = 22,204, p < .01).
These results are robust to differentiating between the extent of continued
search when objective offering price is present and when objective offering price
is absent. They support Hypotheses 1 and 2. The consumer on the purchase
journey who is provided objective offering price continues their search for
product attributes, by clicking through to the detail product listing, at a
significantly higher rate than the consumer who is not provided an objective
offering price on their purchase journey.
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Test of Hypotheses 3 and 4
Hypothesis 3 and 4 state that fewer leads will be generated in the absence
of an objective offering price and that more leads will be generated in the
presence of an objective offering price for a high price, high involvement product.
In this test, leads were measured as a click on the “Contact the Seller” button from
the detail product page on the national third-party website and entry of personal
email address or phone number. Operationally, this suggests that consumers
searching for product information for a high price, high involvement product will
be more likely to click to become a lead from the detailed product listing if
objective price information is provided in the product listing.
To test Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, one-sample t-test was conducted to
examine whether presence of price information increased the likelihood of a
respondent becoming a lead. 165 unique individuals became leads by clicking on
the “Contact the Seller” button on the detail product listing and entered their
email address or phone number. Within that sample, respondents were more
likely to become a lead if they were provided with objective price information
(mean difference = .35, 95% CI of mean difference = .28-.43, t = 9.43, df = 164, p
< .01).
These results are robust to differentiating between lead generation when
objective offering price is present and when objective offering price is absent.
The results support Hypotheses 3 and 4. The consumer on the purchase journey
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who is provided objective offering price becomes a lead, by clicking the “Contact
the Seller” button and providing their email address or phone number, at a
significantly higher rate than the consumer who is not provided an objective
offering price on their purchase journey.
Test of Hypotheses 5 and 6
Hypotheses 5 and 6 state that purchase intent will be weaker in the
absence of an objective offering price and that purchase intent will be stronger in
the presence of an objective offering price for a high price, high involvement
product. In this test, leads were recruited to take a brief, twenty question survey
to assess their purchase intent as a proxy for sales. The three items used to assess
purchase intent were measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = very low to 7 =
very high; alpha reliability of .71). The average time to complete the survey was
about three minutes.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 were examined using an independent sample t-test.
Purchase intent of the respondents was greater when participants were provided
with objective offering price during their purchase journey (mean = 5.33)) than
when they were not (mean = 4.97). This mean difference was significant
(Lavene’s test indicated equality of variances (F = .57, p > .05); mean difference
= -.36, 95% CI of mean difference = -.65 - -.07, t = 2.444, df = 249).
These results support Hypotheses 5 and 6 that providing an objective
offering price during the search portion of the purchase journey will lead to
greater purchase intent (from a greater number of leads as supported by
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Hypotheses 3 and 4) than hiding price and making it more difficult, if not
impossible, to find an objective offering price.
With all six Hypotheses supported by the analysis, there is evidence that
displaying an objective offering price with product listings on a national thirdparty website will increase the extent of search, increase lead generation for
dealers and manufacturers, and positively influence purchase intent such that
respondents who searched for price and found it have greater intention to
purchase. A table of means, mean differences, confidence intervals and
Chronbach alpha are shown in Table 4.
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Discussion
This chapter provides a discussion of the results, as well as the theoretical
and managerial implications of the findings from this research. Limitations of the
research are discussed and future directions are proposed as part of the concluding
comments on this study.
General Discussion
This study investigates the impact of hidden, or unpublished, prices on the
evaluation stage of the purchase journey for high cost, high involvement products.
Specifically, it looks at the impact of missing prices on continued search, lead
generation and purchase intent in the context of new boat sales. New boats are a
high cost, high involvement product. The results provide evidence that for high
cost, high involvement products the absence of objective selling price in the
evaluation phase of the purchase journey leads to less consumer search for
product attributes, less lead generation and less purchase intent, while the
presence of objective selling price leads to more search, more lead generation and
higher purchase intent.
Nearly all of the research in the areas of consumer search, the impact of
knowledge uncertainty on the extent of search, pricing theory, and purchase intent
assumes that objective price information is readily available for search in the
purchase journey. In this long stream of research, no one has empirically looked
at the impact of missing prices on the evaluation and search phase of the purchase
journey and related lead generation and purchase intent. Owen (2003) points out
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in his exploratory work on missing prices that there are many situations
encountered by consumers where price information is missing or hidden. This
study is the first empirical test of the impact on consumer behavior when
objective price is missing or hidden.
Price is a critical determinant of deal valuation, perceived value,
transaction value, acquisition value, formation of internal reference price, the
extent of search, purchase intent, and sales. Much of the rich learnings in these
areas of study are based on objective price being readily available. When
objective price is not available, how does the consumer evaluate the deal, arrive at
perceived value, make an assessment of transaction value and acquisition value,
or form an internal reference price? While there is no evidence presented here
that some or all of these processes may be disrupted when objective selling price
is missing, it suggests that such an assumption might be reasonable. If these
processes are disrupted when objective selling price is missing, that likely leads to
consumers abandoning their search and path to purchase; if not completely, at
least until later. No business wants to do anything to delay a purchase, yet the
common practice in some industries of hiding price likely has that impact based
on the evidence from this study. Missing information, particularly objective
price, that lengthens the purchase journey is not in the best interests of the seller.
Encouraging search to the point of preparedness to purchase is desirable if
the goal is to sell more product. This study demonstrates that providing objective
price during the evaluation stage of the purchase journey, rather than hiding it,
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will encourage continued search for product attributes, likely advancing the
consumer on their path to purchase and improving their preparedness to purchase.
One would expect that the more qualified leads a dealer receives and the
higher the purchase intent of those leads, the more opportunity the dealer has to
close sales and the more sales a dealer will close. The findings in this study that
the presence of price leads to more search for product attributes suggests that
sellers of high cost, high involvement products that hide price are reducing
consumer search related to their product offering. Owen (2003) suggests that
failing to provide an objective offering price can leave buyers feeling manipulated
or forced to engage in a social interaction with a dealer they are not yet prepared
for. The findings in this study empirically confirm that continued search is
delayed, derailed or terminated, potentially ending the purchase journey, when
objective offering price is absent.
Inasmuch as the results of this study show that hiding price reduces search
for product attributes, it also shows that hiding price reduces lead generation and
purchase intent. Purchases of high cost, high involvement products are deliberate
purchases. The purchased time frame can be six, twelve or even twenty-four
months. New boat dealers, and likely sellers of other high cost, high involvement
products, depend on leads as the lifeblood of their business. The evidence from
this field study indicates that hiding price does reduce lead generation, as
consumers who did not see price were not as likely to become leads as consumers
who did see price. Fewer leads means fewer sales opportunities and likely fewer
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sales. Extrapolate the impact on a single dealer to an entire industry and the
potential lost sales could be significant!
The research from Discover Boating suggests that only two percent of
potential first-time boat buyers who begin their purchase journey complete the
journey with the purchase of a boat (Discover Boating, 2017). An increase from
2% to 3% completing their journey with a purchase would lead to a 50% increase
in first-time boat buyers and a 4% increase in annual sales of new boats. This is
significant for an industry where new boats sales grow by 5-6% annually on
average.
Finally, this study provides evidence that when objective price is present,
the purchase intent of leads is significantly higher. Leads with higher purchase
intent likely lead to higher close rates and therefore higher sales. Extant research
has shown that purchase intent is a good proxy for sales. And, new boats map to
all six factors identified by Morwitz, et al. (2007) that are associated with a strong
correlation between purchase intentions and actual purchase.
This study looked at two distinct purchase journeys for buyers of new
boats. In one purchase journey, consumers were provided an objective offering
price. In the other purchase journey, consumers were not provided an objective
offering price. The findings show that consumers who were provided an
objective offering price moved further through the evaluation stage of the
purchase journey. They conducted more search by clicking through to the detail
listing page. They were more likely to become leads by contacting a dealer from
the detail listing page. And, they were measured with higher purchase intent, a
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common proxy for actual purchase. The behavior of consumers who saw price
was significantly different from the behavior of consumers who did not see price.
These findings suggest, that in the internet era of consumer expectations for
transparency, missing prices could be limiting sales of new boats and other high
cost, high involvement products where price is missing in the evaluation stage of
the purchase journey.
Nunes, et al., (2103) state, “The new Rule #1 is, know your customer’s
behavior on their path to purchase (p. 50).” The findings of this study provide
valuable information to help sellers of high cost, high involvement products to
better understand their customer’s behavior on their path to purchase! The results
of this study demonstrate that the behaviors of consumers do differ when
objective price is not available, increasing knowledge uncertainty. This evidence
should be useful to managers contemplating a change in their policy of hiding
objective selling price online and in product literature.
Theoretical contribution
This study makes four theoretical contributions to the literature. First, a
review of the literature suggests this is the first empirical test of the impact of
missing prices on continued search for product attributes, lead generation, and
purchase intent for high cost, high involvement products. While there is a
substantial body of work on pricing, search and purchase intent, until now there
has been a dearth of scenarios studied where objective price is missing. This
study is unique in providing understanding of the impact of missing prices on the
purchase journey and fills in missing information in the extant literature.
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Second, this study adds to the understanding of the impact of price on
purchase intent by considering the impact on purchase intent when objective price
is missing. Purchase intent has been studied in many contexts and extant research
addresses the role of price perceptions on behavioral intentions, generally, and
purchase intentions, specifically. Research has demonstrated that price plays a
significant role in explaining consumer purchase intent (Erikson, et al., 1985). A
behavioral perspective of price concludes that price affects perceived value
(through its impact on acquisition value and transaction value) and perceived
value positively influences purchase intent (Grewal, et al., 1998; Compeau et al.,
1998; Chandrashekaran, 2004). As in other areas of pricing research, research on
the role of price in explaining consumer purchase intent has assumed objective
price is present. But, what impact does the absence of price have on consumer
purchase intent? What role can price play in influencing purchase intent when
price is not available? This study measures the impact on purchase intent for a
high cost, high involvement product when price is not available and concludes
that the absence of objective price negatively influences purchase intent for a high
cost, high involvement consumer product. This fills a gap in the stream of pricing
and purchase intent research and literature.
Third, this study was conducted as a field experiment with random
assignment to obtain unbiased measures of continued search, lead generation and
purchase intent for a high cost, high involvement product in a natural, online
context, overcoming the limitations of using observational data. There tend to be
fewer field experiments with random assignment because, as List and Gneezy
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(2014) point out, “running [field] experiments is a costly undertaking (p. 16).”
The experiment was done in a natural setting in which consumers who are
searching for information on a new boat purchase visit a national third-party
website in the normal course of their daily lives. Visitors to the national thirdparty website were randomly assigned to the treatment group (to see objective
price) or the control group (did not see objective price). This random assignment
facilitates causal inference by making the two samples randomly similar to each
other so that subjects in the treatment group and control group will both have the
same average characteristics.
Fourth, this study is a field experiment with random assignment, so the
results are based on consumer behaviors in two distinct, real-world purchase
journeys (real consumers considering the purchase of real products) rather than on
decisions consumers “might make” in a hypothetical purchase journey, as tested
in most other studies. Consequently, this study furthers the understanding of the
extent to which information (and in this case price information) drives the
behavior of buyers in the marketplace as was suggested by Urbany (1986). It is
also responsive to Owens’ call for future research using the internet to test the
impact of missing prices (Owens, 2003).
Managerial contribution
The findings of this study, while intuitive, are completely contrary to
conventional wisdom in the recreational boating industry where most
manufacturers and dealers do not provide objective price on their own websites or
third-party websites, or in product literature. The results of this study demonstrate
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that providing objective price encourages continued search and is more likely to
generate leads and greater purchase intent. It provides evidence to managers who
are (or should be) considering a fundamental change in their approach to omitting
objective price. This research provides strong support to suggest reconsideration
of pricing strategy in consumer products industries, offering high cost, high
involvement products, where it is still common practice not to advertise objective
selling price.
Making objective price available during the evaluation phase of the
purchase journey, in a transparent manner consistent with the internet age, could
positively impact product sales in a significant manner, not only for individual
manufacturers and dealers but for entire industries such as the recreational boating
industry and similar industries that sell high cost, high involvement products and
hide price.
Limitations and future research
This study is subject to limitations. This study does not follow the
purchase journey to the conclusion of a purchase. While recognizing this
weakness, all of the factors associated with a strong correlation between purchase
intentions and actual purchase identified by Morwitz, et al., (2007) are present for
the product used in this experiment, significantly mitigating this weakness.
However, the conclusions of this study could be strengthened by following the
third-party website visitors who become leads for six to twenty-four months to
determine if there is a significant difference in actual sales based on seeing price
or not seeing price during the evaluation stage of the purchase journey. Allowing
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the experiment to run an extended time is not likely to alter the findings but would
allow for testing the impact of missing prices on sales. A more longitudinal
approach to this study should be considered. This is an area for future researchers
to explore.
Though new boats are a high cost, high involvement product, the context
of this study may not be generalizable to other industries that sell high cost, high
involvement products and hide price during the evaluation stage of the path to
purchase. Although there are few remaining industries that obscure price in their
advertising (online and otherwise), the results of this study should provide
evidence and context to encourage other industries to consider advancing similar
research as they consider whether their current practices are still valid.
In this study, the decision was made to place a cookie on visitors to the
website so that each visitor would only see listings with price or without price, not
both. The results, therefore, apply to differences between individuals who saw
price and did not see price. This research did not consider differences in behavior
within an individual for whom price was visible for some products and not visible
for others. Future research should test differences in behavior related to seeing
price and not seeing price within individuals rather than differences between
individual as was done in this study. Although there is no expectation that the
findings would be different, a study of the difference in behavior within an
individual for whom price was visible for some products and not for others, would
provide evidence of the competitive impact on companies that hold out from
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providing objective price as others in their industry change their pricing practices
based on the evidence provided by this study.
The focus of this study is on high-cost, high involvement consumer
products and B2C communication of objective selling price. A Google search of
“should I publish my prices online” generates an active online discussion among
small B2B businesses about whether to display prices on their website. It appears
that the lack of objective price information in the B2B marketplace is even more
widespread than in the B2C marketplace. Future researchers could study the
impact of missing prices on continued search, lead generation and sales in the
B2B marketplace.
Another potentially productive area of research would be the impact of
missing prices on search engine optimization and the ability to generate traffic to
your website. Do companies who discuss pricing on their website generate more
web traffic than companies who do not discuss pricing on their website.
As happens in the marketplace every day, each manufacturer and their
dealer determined the objective price to be included in the new boat product
listing for this study. Future research could explore the impact of price elasticity
on continued search, lead generation, purchase intent and sales for high cost, high
involvement products. For industries where MSRP is well above actual selling
price, it would be helpful to understand if there is an ideal offering price (such as
Minimum Advertised Price), in terms of dealer margin, from the point of view of
the impact of price elasticity on the dependent variables studied, and sales.
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Finally, researchers might look at how hiding price impacts consumer trust
and firm reputation as well as ethical considerations of hiding price. Indounas
(2008) investigated pricing practices and examined differences between
companies which perceived pricing decisions do entail ethical considerations and
those that do not hold such a belief. He concluded “that a corporate culture that
facilitates a customer orientation towards pricing decisions” is more effective in
meeting consumer needs (Indounas 2008, p. 169). Pricing decisions entail ethical
considerations. Hiding prices is designed to force the buyer to make contact with
a dealer to learn about price. This approach focuses solely on the needs of the
company and not the needs of the buyer.
“Companies that do perceive that pricing decisions are related to ethical
considerations tend to follow a more balanced approach when setting prices by
pursuing both customer- and competition-oriented pricing objectives, without,
however, overlooking financial objectives (Indounas 2008, p. 161).” Future
research could seek to learn whether owners and managers of companies that hide
price perceive there is an ethical consideration in their decision to hide price.
Have owners and managers considered what they might have to gain by avoiding
pricing practices (hiding price) that might have ethical considerations and the
potential ethical implications of their pricing decisions and the impact on
consumer trust and firm reputation?
There is an ongoing debate within businesses, and among business leaders,
about the efficacy of hiding price from potential buyers. This practice is evident
in a few remaining industries of significance that sell high cost, high involvement
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products to consumers. And, may be even more prevalent in B2B marketplaces
based on Google searches of the topic. This study provides evidence for
reconsidering the practice of hiding price for high cost, high involvement
consumer products (and in particular, for new boats). Replication of this research
in other industries offering high cost, high involvement consumer products will
likely be needed to change this business practice in remaining B2C markets.
Replication in B2B markets could provide evidence to help business managers
make an important, and scary, decision to be more transparent in their pricing
strategy. This study has shown that price visibility does lead to more search, more
leads and greater purchase intent. If future studies support this evidence in other
B2C markets and in B2B markets, the impact on sales for businesses that
currently hide price could be significant. This study opens a fertile area for
future research.
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Appendix A
Survey of Purchase Intent for Leads

Start of Block: Welcome to the Survey on Your Purchase Journey

We are interested in understanding the boat purchase journey for purchasers of new
boats. This survey should take you around 3 minutes to complete and you will receive a
$10.00 Starbucks gift card electronically upon completion and submission of the survey.

This research is being conducted by BoatTrader.com and a doctoral student at DePaul
University for a dissertation. You will be asked to answer some questions relevant
to your purchase intent and purchase time frame. You will also be presented a few
demographic questions for classification purposes only. Please be assured that your
responses will be kept completely confidential and in no way identifiable to you. By
completing the survey and submitting your answers you are agreeing to participate in
the research study.
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You can choose not to participate and
have the right to withdraw at any point during the survey, and for any reason. Once you
submit your responses, we will no longer be able to remove your data later from the
study because we will not know which data belongs to you. If you would like to contact
the Principal Investigator in the study to discuss this research, please e-mail Thomas J.
Dammrich at TDAMMRIC@depaul.edu.
By clicking the button below, you are agreeing that your participation in the study is
voluntary, you are 18 years of age, and that you are aware that you may choose to
terminate your participation in the study at any time and for any reason.
Please note that this survey will be best displayed on a laptop or desktop
computer. Some features may be less compatible for use on a mobile device.

End of Block: Welcome to the Survey on Your Purchase Journey
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Start of Block: Let's Get Started

Q1 How many boats (powerboats and/or sailboats) have you purchased?

o None (0)
o 1 (1)
o 2 (2)
o 3 or more (3)
Q2 Do you currently own a boat (powerboat, personal watercraft, or sailboat)?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
End of Block: Let's Get Started
Start of Block: Your Recent Visit to BoatTrader.com
With the following questions we seek to understand your purchase journey for a new
boat. On your recent visit to BoatTrader.com you contacted a dealer. Please answer
these questions keeping in mind the boat model you contacted a dealer about.
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Q3 Did you visit a dealer or manufacturer website before visiting BoatTrader.com?

o Yes (1)
o No (0)
Q4 Did you see a price on BoatTrader.com for the new boat you contacted the dealer
about?

o Yes (1)
o No (0)
Q5 Have you seen an offering price on the new boat you contacted the dealer about
other than on BoatTrader.com?

o Yes (1)
o No (0)
Q6 Have you searched for other brands and models of new powerboats?

o Yes (1)
o No (0)
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Q7 My knowledge of the price for the new boat I contacted the dealer about is...

o Very low (1)
o Low (2)
o Moderate (3)
o High (4)
o Very high (5)

Q8 I expect to purchase a new boat within the next...

o 30 Days (1)
o 60 days (2)
o 90 days (3)
o 6 months (4)
o 12 months (5)
o More than 12 months (6)
o Unknown (7)
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Q9 If I were going to buy a boat, the probability of buying this model is...

o Very Low (1)
o Low (2)
o Somewhat low (3)
o Moderate (4)
o Somewhat high (5)
o High (6)
o Very high (7)

Q10 The probability that I would consider buying this boat is...

o Very Low (1)
o Low (2)
o Somewhat low (3)
o Moderate (4)
o Somewhat high (5)
o High (6)
o Very High (7)
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Q11 The probability that I would purchase a boat is...

o Very Low (1)
o Low (2)
o Somewhat low (3)
o Moderate (4)
o Somewhat high (5)
o High (6)
o Very High (7)
Display This Question:
If The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = Very Low
Or The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = Low
Or The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = Somewhat low
Or The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = Moderate
Or The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = Somewhat high
Or The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = High
Or The probability that I would purchase a boat is... = Very High

Q12 The probability that I would purchase a boat is...
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Please rate probability from 0% to 100%
()
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Q13 What do you expect to pay for the new boat you saw on BoatTrader.com and
contacted a dealer about?
________________________________________________________________

Q14 Do you consider the new boat you contacted the dealer about to be affordable?

o Yes (1)
o No (0)
End of Block: Your Recent Visit to BoatTrader.com
Start of Block: Wrapping It Up
The following questions are used for classification purposes only.

Q15 What is your age?

o 18 to 34 (1)
o 35 to 55 (2)
o 56 to 65 (3)
o 66 to 75 (4)
o 76 or older (5)
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Q16 What is your gender?

o Male (2)
o Female (1)
Q17 Which of the following best describes your current relationship status?

o Married (1)
o Widowed (2)
o Divorced (3)
o Separated (4)
o Single, but cohabiting with a significant other (5)
o Single, never married (6)
Q18 What is the highest level of school you have completed or highest degree you have
received?

o Less than high school diploma (1)
o High school diploma or equivalent (e.g., GED) (2)
o Some college but no degree (3)
o Associate degree (4)
o Bachelor degree (5)
o Graduate degree (6)
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Q19 How many people live in your household?

o 1 (1)
o 2 (2)
o 3 (3)
o 4 (4)
o 5 (5)
o 6 or more (6)
Q20 What is your approximate annual household income?

o $0 to $49,999 (1)
o $50,000 to $74,999 (2)
o $75,000 to 99,999 (3)
o $100,000 to $149,999 (4)
o $150,000 to $199,000 (5)
o $200,000 and up (6)
o Prefer Not to Answer (7)
Q21 What is your zip code?
________________________________________________________________
End of Block: Wrapping It Up
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Appendix B
IRB Letters of Approval
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Appendix C
Recruitment Email for Survey of Leads
Dear Website Visitor,
We are interested in understanding the boat purchase journey for purchasers of
new boats. Website is cooperating on research that is being conducted by a
doctoral student at DePaul University, Chicago, IL. You are receiving this request
because you recently visited Website and contacted a dealer by email or phone
about a new boat listing you viewed on Website.
We are asking you to participate in this research by completing a brief survey at
[insert link]. The survey will take you about 3 minutes to complete and you
will receive a $10.00 Starbucks gift card electronically immediately upon
completion of the survey. You will be asked about your current boat ownership,
purchase intent, purchase time frame and a few demographic questions for
categorization purposes only. Please be assured that your responses will be kept
completely confidential and in no way identifiable to you.
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You can choose not to participate
and have the right to withdraw at any point during the survey, and for any reason.
If you would like to contact the Principal Investigator in the study to discuss this
research, please e-mail Thomas J. Dammrich at TDAMMRIC@depaul.edu or call
him at 312-946-6220.
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact Susan
Loess-Perez, DePaul University’s Director of Research Compliance, in the Office
of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by email at sloesspe@depaul.edu. You
may also contact DePaul’s Office of Research Services if:
•
•
•

Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the
research team.
You cannot reach the research team.
You want to talk to someone besides the research team.

We thank you for your patronage of Website, and if you choose to complete the
survey, we thank you for your willingness to assist in this important research.
Website.com
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Figures
Figure 1. Comparison of Traditional and Contemporary Purchase Journey
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Figure 2. Hypothesized Relationships
Independent
Dependent Variables
Variables

Direction of
Relationship

1. Continued Product Attribute Search—Hypothesis H1 and H2

2. Lead Generation—Hypothesis H3 and H4

3. Purchase Intent—Hypothesis H5 and H6
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Figure 3. Study Design Flowchart
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Figure 4. Sample Search Results Page
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Figure 5. Sample Detail Product Page
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Figure 6. Sample Dialogue Box for Lead Data
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Industry Participants
Third-party National Website for New Boat Listings
Manufacturer Boat Brands
Powerboat Segments
New Boat Dealers
New Boat Listings

N
1
19
8
170
2,396

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics
Sample

N

Search Results Page Listing Views

54,681

Detailed Product Page Listing Views (continued search)
Clickthrough Rate

22,205
41%

Total Leads from Detail Listing Views
Email Leads
Phone Leads
Lead Generation Rate
Email Leads from Secondary Method
Total Recruitment Emails New Boat Listings

165
118
47
0.8%
4,483
4,601

Survey Completions
Survey Response Rate

252
5.5%
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
Age of Respondents
18-34
35-55
56-65
Over 65

Respondents

N
12.7%
49.6%
24.2%
11.5%

Male Respondents

87.0%

Living with Spouse or Partner

81.7%

College Educated

68.0%

Three or More People Living in Household

50.0%

Household Income
$0-$99,999
$100,000 and up
Prefer Not to Answer

24.2%
61.1%
20.7%
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Table 4

Means, Mean Difference, Confidence Interval and Cronbach's Alpha Reliability
Mean
Variable
N
Mean Difference 95% CI
1. Continued Search
22,205
0.58
.57 - .58
a. Control Group (no price displayed)
0
b. Treatment Group (price displayed)
0.58
2. Lead Generation
165
0.35
.28 - .43
a. Control Group (no price displayed)
0
b. Treatment Group (price displayed)
0.35
3. Purchase Intent
a. Control Group (no price displayed)
b. Treatment Group (price displayed)
**p < .01

252

4.97
5.33

-0.36

-.65 - -.07

t

df

p value

174.14 22204.00 < .01**

Chronbach's
Alpha
--

9.43

164.00

< .01**

--

2.44

249.00

< .01**

.71
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